At a Glance
Speaking the Unspeakable: The Southern Sudan Case
Aggrey Jaden's historical significance lies in his willingness to speak clearly about a political reality that the conventions of postcolonial African diplomacy, committed to the principle of inherited colonial borders and deeply resistant to any precedent of territorial revision, made it extraordinarily difficult to name. What Jaden said, at the Round Table Conference in 1965 and in the political documents and statements of his SANU leadership period, was this: that the people of southern Sudan had not been liberated by Sudanese independence but had exchanged one form of colonial administration for another; that the political, cultural, and physical violence that the northern-dominated Sudanese state was directing against the south was not a transitional problem of national integration but a structural feature of the relationship between a northern political establishment and a southern population it regarded as inferior and available for subjugation; and that the appropriate response to this situation was not the patient negotiation of better terms within a framework of Sudanese unity but the assertion of the southern Sudanese people's right to determine their own political future.
This position was radical in the context of 1960s African politics. The Organisation of African Unity had made the inviolability of colonial borders a foundational principle of its collective diplomacy, and for good reason — the alternative, a continent-wide opening of every colonial boundary to revision by force, offered only chaos. But the OAU's border principle also had the effect of foreclosing political solutions that the actual diversity and actual history of African states sometimes urgently required, and Sudan was a case in which the principle was being used to deny the most elementary political legitimacy to communities that had been incorporated into a state against their will and were being governed with a combination of neglect and violence that, by any reasonable standard, constituted colonial rather than national rule. Jaden was not ignorant of the complications; he was insisting that the southern Sudan case was one in which the complications had to be confronted rather than wished away in the name of continental solidarity with a northern political establishment that was doing things in the south that the same African governments would have condemned as colonialism had a European power been doing them.
The formation of SANU in 1963 gave this political position an institutional form — a liberation movement organised on the model that the era's African liberation movements had developed, with exile political structures, relationships with sympathetic African governments, international advocacy efforts, and coordination with armed forces in the field. Jaden's contribution to this organisation was both strategic and representative: he gave articulate expression to positions that the more diplomatically minded members of the southern political community were reluctant to state so plainly, and he represented the Equatoria region's perspective — the perspective of the south's southernmost province, the part of the country most remote from Khartoum and most thoroughly shaped by the separate development of the southern administered under British rule.
The 1965 Round Table Conference was the moment at which Jaden's political positions received their fullest public expression and their most consequential test. The conference had been convened by Sudan's post-Abboud parliamentary government as a genuine attempt to find a negotiated solution to the southern problem, and it brought together northern political parties, southern political leaders, and observers from African governments in a forum that offered, at least in principle, a real possibility of agreement. Jaden presented the southern case with clarity: he argued for a degree of southern autonomy that the northern parties were not prepared to grant, and he framed that argument in terms of the south's specific historical experience and its accumulated evidence that northern assurances of equal treatment could not be trusted. The conference's failure was not his failure — the northern parties' unwillingness to offer the genuine power-sharing that the south required was the decisive obstacle — but it confirmed his assessment that the southern position needed to become more explicit about the right to self-determination rather than seeking the least unacceptable version of continued union.
The divisions within SANU that split the organisation after the conference reflected real strategic disagreements about how to respond to this failure. William Deng Nhial's decision to return to Sudan and work within the political system represented a different theory of how southern political objectives could be advanced — a theory that Jaden judged to be based on an insufficient assessment of the northern political establishment's willingness to share power genuinely. The subsequent assassination of Deng in 1968, murdered in circumstances that most observers attributed to government responsibility, seemed to vindicate the more pessimistic view of what engagement with northern politics offered. But the split had weakened SANU and fragmented the organised political representation of the southern cause at a crucial moment.
Jaden continued to represent the harder line on southern self-determination through the years of the Anyanya insurgency, operating from exile as the military situation inside the south developed its own logic and its own leadership structures. The relationship between the external political organisations and the internal armed movement was always complicated — the men in the bush had their own priorities and their own political visions, and the exile political leaders were sometimes more of a complicating factor than a unifying force in the southern movement's development. The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, negotiated by Joseph Lagu on behalf of the Anyanya forces and by Joseph Garang and others on behalf of the south's political leadership, established a regional autonomy arrangement for the south within a united Sudan — the kind of outcome that Jaden had argued was insufficient, and the subsequent history of the agreement's erosion and the renewal of war in 1983 would suggest that his pessimism about the durability of autonomy arrangements without genuine power-sharing had been well-founded.
The independence of South Sudan in July 2011 was the culmination of a process that Jaden's generation of leaders had initiated — the insistence, against the overwhelming weight of regional and international opinion in the 1960s, that southern Sudanese people had the right to determine their own political future. The specific path that led to that outcome — the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, the referendum of January 2011, the formal declaration of independence on 9 July 2011 — involved actors and processes far removed from the SANU politics of the 1960s, but the political foundation on which the CPA was built — the acceptance of the principle that southern Sudan's status within or without a Sudanese state was a question for the southern people themselves to answer — was the principle that Jaden had asserted at the Round Table Conference nearly half a century earlier. His life's work was the insistence that this principle be taken seriously; the history of the decades after his death in 1993 was the slow, agonising, enormously costly process of the world's political institutions arriving at the same conclusion.